The New Battleground: Song-and-dance in China’s Muslim borderlands by Harris, Rachel
 
The New Battleground: Song-and-dance in China’s Muslim borderlands  
 





This article explores the tensions between formulations of ethnic and religious 
identity among the Uyghurs: a Turkic Muslim people who live mainly in northwest 
China. It traces the ways in which these tropes of identity are played out in discourse 
surrounding ‘song-and-dance’ (naxsha-usul) in the transnational space of online web 
forums and social media posts which link Uyghurs in the ‘homeland’ (weten)—the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—with Uyghurs in the diaspora in Central Asia, 
Turkey, Europe and America. China has long sought to depict its minority 
nationalities as people who are ‘good at singing and dancing’, and Uyghurs have also 
embraced musical performance as an important aspect of their national identity. Over 
the past twenty years, however, an Islamic revival has provided the context for new 
Uyghur voices that condemn song-and-dance as both un-Islamic and a tool of colonial 
oppression. There is a strongly gendered dimension to this discourse, which 
frequently casts Uyghur women’s bodies as the site of these contested identities. This 
article considers how Uyghurs, and especially Uyghur women, express and negotiate 
these shifting identities and shifting ethical norms through their embodied behaviours 
in a context where verbal debate is tightly controlled by state policies within Xinjiang 
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Musical performance, dance and theatre are unquestionably central to modern 
formulations of Uyghur national identity, and have been so since the early twentieth 
century (Harris 2008; Light 2008; Mijit 2016). When the Uyghur region was 
incorporated into the Peoples Republic of China in 1955, the Uyghurs were formally 
recognized as one of China’s fifty-five ‘minority nationalities’ (少数民族), and the 
development of Uyghur national culture came under the rubric of China’s 
nationalities policies. The mid-twentieth century saw the beginning of considerable 
state investment in the ‘modernization and development’ of Uyghur musical traditions 
(Trebinjac 2000; Wong 2012), including extensive research and documentation, and 
the implementation of a system of professional performing arts troupes who were 
attached to towns and cities right across the region. These troupes developed styles of 
folkloric performance of Uyghur national traditions, which came to be termed ‘song-
and-dance’ (naxsha-usul).  
 
On China’s national stage too, the minority song-and-dance troupes (Tibetans, 
Mongols, Dai, Miao, etc.) came to play a highly visible role in PRC representations of 
national and revolutionary culture, and the rhetoric of the singing and dancing ethnic 
minorities was born, a trope that continues to dominate representations of China’s 
minority nationalities today. In Dru Gladney’s well-known but still apt formulation: 
 
One cannot be exposed to China without being confronted by its ‘colorful’ 
minorities. They sing, they dance, they twirl; they whirl. Most of all they smile, 
showing their happiness to be part of the motherland. (Gladney 1994: 95) 
 
As many commentators (Hann 1991, Harrell 1996) have argued, China’s promotion 
of ethnic minority arts serves as a pay-off for real autonomy in the political sphere. 
But beyond this, minority song-and-dance has played an active role in establishing 
and normalizing the hierarchical relationship between Han Chinese majority and 
ethnic minority peoples, and the territorial relationship between the Chinese state and 
the regions inhabited by these peoples. In her ethnography of the Miao people of 
southwest China, Louisa Schein (2000) examines how representations of Miao 
identity on the national stage produce them as both feminized keepers of Chinese 
tradition and as exotic Other against which the dominant Han Chinese can assert their 
own modernity. She notes how these relationships are replicated and upheld through 
numerous representations and encounters, from glamorous TV shows and media 
reports to small-scale and often seedy tourist performances. These relationships are 
found across the different minority regions of China, especially in areas where 
tourism has flourished in recent years. In Xinjiang, I have observed many such 
encounters between Chinese tourists and young Uyghur women in performances from 
Urumchi’s central tourist destination, the ‘Big Bazaar’,1 to small restaurants in the 
historical town of Turpan. Smiling young women in dance costumes serve as instantly 





Performance by the Xinjiang Song and Dance Troupe in Urumchi, May 2009, 
[Xinhua] 
 
The continuing deployment of song-and-dance to symbolize the hierarchical and 
gendered relationship between Han big brother and ethnic minority little brothers and 
sisters was much in evidence at the sixtieth anniversary gala performance on Beijing’s 
Tian’anmen square in 2009. Its lavish programme placed heavy emphasis on ethnic 
minority song-and-dance. Alongside a military parade displaying an impressive array 
of hardware, thousands of brightly dressed, smiling young women danced in 
disciplined rows to the sounds of 1950s revolutionary songs such as ‘Xinjiang is a 
Good Place’, ‘Our Motherland is a Garden’ and ‘A Li Mountain Girls’. These and 
many other minority revolutionary songs provided the backdrop to the political 
campaigns, social upheaval and violence of the Cultural Revolution. The 2009 gala 
celebration was an apt illustration, indeed a deliberate reminder, of the continuities 
between the early revolutionary period and the present-day in the way that ethnic 
minority song-and-dance is deployed to symbolize the big family of nations that 
comprises the Peoples Republic of China.  
 
This relationship is embodied at the highest levels of political power. Chinese media 
images of the 2009 gala showed then president Hu Jintao surrounded by appropriately 
costumed and smiling ethnic minority young women. The wife of the current 
president Xi Jinping, the star singer Peng Liyuan, is famous for her lavishly 
choreographed song-and-dance performance of the Tibetan revolutionary folk song, 
‘Emancipated Serfs Sing Proudly’. There is a clearly territorial dimension to these 
cultural representations, since large areas of the territory claimed by the PRC are 
regions that were—prior to the intensive Han immigration of the 1980s and 1990s—
principally populated by non-Han Chinese peoples whose historical relationship with 
China was not easily reducible to one of continuous belonging. Repeated 
performances of the minority revolutionary songs—declaring these minority peoples’ 
love for Chairman Mao and their gratitude to the Chinese Communist Party—on 
national media, in schools, tourist shows and countless other contexts serve to 
naturalize the status of these peoples as ‘minority nationalities’ and uphold the rule of 
the Chinese Communist Party over these often contested territories (Yeh 2013). 
 
And yet, Uyghur identification with song-and-dance (naxsha-usul) cannot be easily 
dismissed as a top-down politicized imposition by central government. In 
contemporary Uyghur society, the professional musicians of the Uyghur state troupes 
are widely respected and their VCD releases are eagerly consumed. Uyghur parents 
heavily invest in their children’s ability to reproduce professional song-and-dance 
performances, and take pleasure in dressing their little girls in miniature song-and-
dance troupe outfits. Uyghur song-and-dance—as a notion and set of practices related 
to but distinct from traditional forms of music-making—has a particular history and 
set of meanings and values, dating back to the early twentieth century. Rather than 
understanding song-and-dance as a tool of control developed by the Chinese 
Communist Party and imposed on a passive and resentful Uyghur population, we need 
to understand song-and-dance as a co-creation whose roots stretch back well beyond 
the founding of the Peoples Republic of China. Mukaddas Mijit argues that it was the 
early to mid-twentieth century Central Asian Muslim reformists (Jadids) who first 
developed the notion of Uyghur national culture and used musical performance to 
convey social reformist messages, long before the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army 
marched into Xinjiang. In part under the influence of Soviet models of cultural 
reform, Uyghur ‘Sanai Nepis’ theatre troupes of the 1930s produced the foundations 
of a new national repertoire based on local traditions of muqam, dastan epic stories 
and the meshrep songs of the ashiq Sufi mendicants: early revisions of the Twelve 
Muqam, staged versions of epic love stories: Leili-Majnun, Ferhad-Shirin, Gherip-
Senem, and many more items of Uyghur national musical culture that still resonate 
strongly with Uyghur listeners today (Mijit 2015: 32-36; see also Harris 2008: 29-33).  
 
There was considerable continuity with the work started by these Uyghur nationalist 
reformers and the work of ‘developing minority traditions’ subsequently carried out 
within the framework of the minority song-and-dance troupes after ‘Liberation’ by the 
Chinese Communist Party. Most of the cultural workers engaged in this task in the 
1940s (musicians like Musajan Rozi and Gheyazdin Barat) simply continued their 
work under the new regime. Many of them suffered badly under the political 
campaigns of the late 1950s or during the Cultural Revolution—accused of ‘counter-
revolutionary’ links to the pre-Liberation nationalist movements—but they cemented 
their reputation as founders of Uyghur national culture, and some (such as the singer 
Pasha Ishan) were rewarded by the state with (largely symbolic) positions on the 
National Peoples Congress. Educated Uyghur urbanites today maintain considerable 
investment in song-and-dance, which they regard as a central part of modern national 
Uyghur culture and identity. 
 
The Uyghur Islamic revival 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, the relaxation of controls on international travel and trade 
under Deng Xiaoping’s post-Cultural Revolution reforms facilitated renewed links 
between Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the wider Islamic world. These renewed ties, 
alongside relatively relaxed policies on religious expression, gradually began to 
introduce new ways of being Muslim into Uyghur society. The beginning of the 
twenty-first century saw the rise of intense interest in ways of being Muslim right 
across Uyghur society, both within Xinjiang and in the Uyghur diaspora, cutting 
across the rural-urban divide. Over the next ten years, it developed into a major 
revival in religious practice. Greater numbers of people adopted a pious lifestyle, and 
many travelled abroad to study Islam or for the hajj, while wealthy businessmen 
sponsored the building of new mosques for their local communities. This Uyghur 
Islamic revival has been accompanied by and facilitated by the circulation of a wide 
range of media carrying Muslim imagery and sounds, from pamphlets on how to 
perform daily prayers to recordings of Qur’anic recitation, sermons and anashid 
religious songs.  
 
The revival was largely tolerated by the local authorities, aside from occasional 
crackdowns on the circulation of ‘extremist’ religious material, until the 2009 
interethnic violence in the regional capital Urumchi. On 5 July, an initially peaceful 
demonstration by Uyghur students was met by police violence, provoking a night of 
rioting and bloodshed.2 This incident was followed by a major police crackdown that 
included mass arrests, public executions, the expulsion of Uyghur rural migrants from 
Urumchi, and the introduction of sweeping controls on many aspects of daily life for 
Uyghurs across the region, including the shut down of Xinjiang’s Internet for over six 
months. In this atmosphere of heightened repression the upsurge in interest in Islam 
intensified, sometimes merging with the growing Uyghur resentment of Chinese rule. 
Accordingly, the Xinjiang authorities began to tighten their control over religious 
expression, routinely employing the coercive resources of the state to this end. As the 
anti-extremism campaign gathered in force over the following few years, the scope of 
its controls widened, and an increasingly wide range of religious practices were 
subsumed under the rubric of ‘Islamic extremism’ and criminalized (Harris 2015).  
 
In this context, discussing or attempting to learn about Islam within Xinjiang became 
an increasingly dangerous activity. As the region’s mosques came under increasing 
surveillance, and public expressions of faith—including veiling, growing beards, 
praying in public, fasting, religious gatherings—were criminalized, people 
increasingly turned to the private sphere to practice and learn more about their new-
found faith. In this way, Uyghur websites—usually hosted outside Xinjiang—online 
forums, blogs and discussion boards began to play an important role in promoting and 
disseminating Islamic texts, discussions, images and sounds. The newly emerging 
field of social media became especially important as a ‘public-private’ site where 
people could access a wide range of Islamic media, and as a medium for sharing new 
ideas about Islam and Uyghur identity. Social media linked Uyghurs in Xinjiang with 
their friends and relatives in the diaspora in geographically far-flung but virtually 
intimate groups who could share and respond to media items almost in real time, 
awarding emoticons to particularly affective examples of Qur’anic recitation, 
discussing the correct series of gestures for prayer, or sharing outrage at some 
perceived breach of religious etiquette. 
 
Social media and religious identities 
 
Here, I want to pose two questions. What role do specific media technologies play in 
the making and remaking of religious and ethnic identity in terms of experience, 
community, and authority? And how is the ideology and performance of song-and-
dance—that is the staged and mediated performance of national culture—imbricated 
in this shifting field? Martin Daughtry’s consideration of the ways in which musical 
icons provide texts for the negotiation of identities, is helpful in thinking about these 
questions. Daughtry discusses the debates amongst Russians over what the Russian 
national anthem should sound like in the twenty-first century. Since ideologies and 
collective self-images are always subject to conflicting and changing interpretations, 
he argues, they are necessarily conditional, contestable and fluid. For this reason it is 
more productive to regard an anthem not as the static reflection of a monolithic 
ideology but rather as a polysemous text through which national identity is constantly 
being negotiated (Daughtry 2003). Similarly, the powerful and fraught trope of song-
and-dance as a signifier of Uyghur national identity is negotiated and contested by 
multiple actors in transnational contexts in ways that bear witness to, and help to 
shape, political realities on the ground. Aihwa Ong provides useful ways of thinking 
about identity politics as they are expressed and negotiated across electronically or 
digitally mediated transnational networks. Ong views discourses of diaspora not as 
descriptions of already formed social entities, but rather as specific political practices 
projected on a global scale. She argues that electronic technology disembeds ethnic 
formation from particular milieus of social life. In this way, terms like diaspora or 
nation acquire specific emotional and ideological meanings, and are invoked by 
disparate transnational groups as a way to construct coalitions that cut across national 
spaces (Ong 2003:88). As I will argue, however, embodied practices forged in 
digitally mediated circulation are often subsequently re-embedded in in local customs. 
 
A Love Story 
 
One example of the often-virulent debates amongst Uyghur netizens surrounding the 
trope of song-and-dance emerged in November 2011, when a young Uyghur woman, 
who was then studying in Turkey, appeared on a Turkish TV talent show singing a 
song in the Chinese language. While the Turkish judges made encouraging comments 
in response to her halting rendition of the song, and stressed the friendly racial ties 
between Uyghurs and Turks in their responses, Uyghur netizens based in the diaspora 
responded with outrage. A video clip of her performance was posted on YouTube, 
and a series of Turkish and Uyghur language videos shouted ‘Collaborator!’ and 
‘Shame on you, Chinese whore!’ while a farting cartoon cat opined that she had 
learned the song in ‘Mr Wang’s teahouse’ (i.e. a Chinese brothel).  
 
The controversy spread to the American state-funded Radio Free Asia Uyghur 
service, where the young woman was condemned by interviewees in somewhat more 
measured terms for undoing years of hard work by Uyghur activists in Turkey in 
raising awareness of ‘the plight of the Uyghurs’. This act of publically singing a love 
song in the Chinese language, on what the activists in the diaspora clearly regarded as 
their home turf, was anathema to them because it offered a very different impression 
of Chinese-Uyghur relations from that which they sought to promote amongst the 
Turkish public. For them, a Uyghur voluntarily singing in Chinese in a public forum 
was tantamount to signalling acceptance of Chinese rule in Xinjiang. For a Uyghur 
woman to sing in Chinese in public was a fatal moral lapse, which damaged the body-
politic of the Uyghur nation. 
 
The determined efforts at boundary making by the Uyghur activists belied the 
remarkable transnational affective history of the particular song that the young 
woman chose to sing.3 This song, ‘Historia de Amor’, was composed by Carlos 
Almaran in Panama and first released in 1955. It has since enjoyed global popularity, 
sung by a host of major artists from Nana Mouskouri to Eartha Kitt. In 1960 it was 
translated into Chinese under the title, ‘In my heart there is only you’ (我的⼼⾥只有
你) and released in a lush orchestration with a Latin-style trumpet solo, poignantly 
sung by the Hong Kong singer and dubbing artist Tsin Ting, who provided the vocals 
for some of Hong Kong’s best-known films of the 1960s and 1970s. The song’s 
popularity in the Chinese-speaking world was assured by a subsequent version by the 
major Taiwanese star of the 1980s, Deng Lijun (Teresa Teng), and it was more 
recently given a new lease of life with an up-tempo samba version by the 
androgynous star Li Yuchun (Chris Lee), who herself came to fame through a 
Chinese TV talent show in 2005 (Harris & Pease 2013). The young woman who sang 
it on a Turkish TV show, like many of the young elite in Xinjiang who were educated 
in the Chinese system, shared in this cosmopolitan tradition of Chinese popular 
culture which is itself inflected through the colonial histories of Shanghai, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan (Jones 2001). 
 
How might a performance of this globalized and highly affective hit song be 
reconfigured as an act of betrayal, prostituting the Uyghur nation to China? Gendered 
attitudes were very much to the fore in the response of the online Uyghur activists: 
not only the traditional unease with women’s public performance, but also the 
diasporic tendency to place the responsibility for upholding cultural values squarely 
on the shoulders of women (Appadurai 1996). At a time of mourning following the 
interethnic violence between Uyghurs and Han that took place in the regional capital 
of Urumchi in 2009, the videos and comments made very clear, the only appropriate 
sounds for Uyghur women to make were the sounds of grief and the sounds of protest. 
This perception, along with the borrowed sounds and images they drew on, linked 
their nationalist discourse to the sphere of political Islam.4 
 
 
Still from one of the activist videos, borrowed from AFP, showing women in 
Urumchi protesting against the mass arrests of 2009. 
 
The pathways of the controversy illustrated Henry Jenkins’s (2008) notion of 
‘convergence culture’ as the vitriol flowed across old and new media platforms from 
Turkey to the United States, and Uyghur internet activists took advantage of new 
technologies to annotate, appropriate and recirculate media content, drawing freely on 
Islamist imagery and sounds, news reports from mainstream media, combining them 
with nationalist rhetoric and sexist and racist slurs. It was also an object reminder of 
the ways that grassroots online discourse tends to promote traditional authority and 
preserve gender hierarchies. 
 
A WeChat Sermon 
 
Fast forward two years, to a new media platform. By 2013, the smartphone app 
Weixin (WeChat), owned by the Chinese IT giant Tencent, had become the media of 
choice for some 600 million users worldwide, 500 million of them within China. 
Amongst Uyghur users too, Undidar, as it is known in Uyghur, became an essential 
communication tool. From mid-2013 to mid-2014, possibly several million Uyghurs 
inside Xinjiang and in the diaspora were using this app, often several times a day, to 
chat with their friends and to participate in online groups or circles, sharing short 
audio messages, text, images, links, audio and video files. It was largely through the 
medium of Undidar—though also linked to other media platforms including 
Facebook, YouTube, and Chinese equivalents Youku and Tudou—that we observed a 
steady rise in the circulation of religious images, audio-video files, audio messages 
and discussion.5 All this communication continued for over a year with apparently 
little control or surveillance, until the state apparently caught up with the new 
technology and implemented a crackdown in summer 2014. 
 
A rich literature now exists concerning the role of media technologies in the rise of 
new forms of Islamic ideologies and sensibilities in the Middle East and Africa. 
Hirschkind’s influential (2006) study of the Islamic revival in Cairo explores the 
means by which Islamic ethical traditions have been recalibrated to a modern political 
and technological order. He notes the pivotal role that cassette sermons played in the 
expanding arena of debate that he termed the ‘Islamic counterpublic’. Cassette 
sermons, he argues, have profoundly transformed the political geography of the 
Middle East. They form part of the acoustic architecture of a distinct moral vision: 
recorded vocal performances that create the sensory conditions for the emergence of 
new publics and new ethical and political worlds. In Xinjiang, Uyghur consumption 
and sharing of new religious media was a largely private and secretive affair. 
Anthropologist Cindy Huang describes the use of religious media by one of her 
informants in Urumchi in the early 2000s. When she was at home, Peride performed 
her daily prayers and surrounded herself with religious media. When she was working 
(as a shop assistant), she rarely mentioned religion (Huang 2009: 39). Such 
‘subterranean’ listening practices, and their particular entwinings of sound and 
subject, are increasingly common in the modern sensory landscape (Hirschkind 2006: 
73), especially under conditions of tight state control. In Xinjiang, as the anti-religious 
extremism campaign tightened its hold, public expression of religious faith became 
too ‘sensitive’ for the public sphere, but the sphere of social media gave people an 
illusory sense of privacy, a sense of speaking within a group of intimate friends. In 
this sphere, emerging forms of religiosity and new forms of affective connection 
flourished. 
 
The religious media circulating on Undidar during this period was diverse, revealing a 
wide range of religious sensibilities, and ongoing debates on what constitutes true 
Islam and how to be a good Muslim. The majority of postings promoted, through 
images, text and audio files, the values of daily prayer, modesty and charity as part of 
an ideal Muslim lifestyle. One circle, for example, included people from Kashgar, 
Urumchi, Ghulja, Beijing, Guangzhou, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Dubai, the 
US and Europe. They were involved in raising money for the poor and sick in 
southern Xinjiang, and frequently shared quite gruesome images of injured or sick 
children along with phone numbers and bank account details for contributions. Many 
people, especially women, posted daily images and short texts that promoted idealized 
notions of Islamic womanhood, piety, and self-restraint. One educated woman, for 
example, posted regularly in four languages (Uyghur, Chinese, Turkish and English). 
On just one day, she posted a children’s poem in Uyghur, a short text in Chinese 
reading, ‘The darker the road, the brighter the light’, and another in Uyghur: 
‘Ramadan, don’t end. I wish for my sins to be taken away. Please take my sins away 
with you’. On the same day, a Uyghur businessman posted an image of a man at 
prayer, with a text that promoted emotional styles of prayer as a psychological tool for 
withstanding social injustice and violence: 
 
I pressed my forehead to the prayer mat and I said, ‘Be patient’, 
There is no justice or peace in this world, 
There are tears in my eyes, 
Only by praying to Allah can you find peace …  
My prayer mat is wet with my tears. 
 
Many people shared recordings of Qur’anic recitation, and used them to develop their 
own religious practice, listening regularly to popular reciters from across the Middle 
East, and learning to recite simpler passages of the Qur’an for themselves by imitating 
the recordings. Other new religious ideologies and listening practices were spreading 
across Uyghur social media during this period; ideologies which provided a more 
overtly political response to the situation. A Uyghur language sermon (tebligh) 
circulating on Undidar in 2013 provides an example. The sermon depicts the 
subjugation of the Uyghurs under Chinese rule as a punishment by God for their 
failure to follow true Islam, and it links a range of immoral behaviours, including 
listening to music, to the downfall of the Uyghur nation: 
 
 … On the Day of Judgement Allah will open the doors of hell to the nation 
who forgets him. Allah will punish the nation who does not follow him. … 
Invaders will come and make them slaves; enemies will come and kill them. 
There will be rumours, and no decency in society, only prostitution, drinking, 
gambling, songs and music everywhere, and this will bind the whole nation in 
chains. They will burn in hell after they die ...  We are under Allah’s 
punishment now. We are like slaves under the oppressive Communist regime. 
When will the people of this nation wake up and open their eyes, hold the holy 
book in their hands, and recover their morality? When will they have hope? 
When will our girls protect their modesty? Only then will great Allah will give 
our nation victory.6  
 
This recorded sermon is interesting not only for its rhetoric but also for the style of 
delivery. The voice is that of an obviously educated, young Uyghur man who speaks 
in an even, restrained but insistent tone. The recording style, with its heavy use of 
reverb, is typical of many recorded sermons worldwide, and indexically linked to the 
echoing spaces of Saudi Arabia’s huge mosques (Frishkopf 2009), the original source 
of the Salafi revivalist movements. The experience of solitary and secretive listening 
to this mediated voice on a smartphone provides a particular intimacy and frisson to 
the listening experience and, paradoxically, a sense of companionship and community 
created in that act of listening (Bull 2000). Audio media like this impel us to pay 
attention to the affective power of the voice and the particularities of the mediated 
voice. They impel us to focus on the sound quality of particular media forms. Audio 
files shared on smartphone are particularly good at transmitting affective properties 
because they help focus attention on the voice. The typically poor sound quality of 
these audio files—often recorded by individuals on their phones, uploaded and 
shared—means that they are also good at signifying authenticity, good at conveying 
the urgency and affective impact of a charged moment of experience, caught and 
frozen in time and shared.  
 
Dorothea Schulz has argued that the mediated voice has a special potential for 
mobilizing people’s agentive and affective faculties. Writing on the experience of 
listening to recorded sermons in Mali, she notes that the human voice is considered by 
people in Mali to ‘touch’ listeners in a way that is physically experienced, and for this 
reason it has the capacity to move individuals from an attitude of passivity to action 
(Schulz 2012). The movement from passivity to forms of action entail for the majority 
of Uyghur listeners no more and no less than adopting the forms of self-discipline 
required by a pious lifestyle: daily prayer, fasting, and especially women’s adoption 
of codes of modesty. In the post-2009 period, such forms of action came to be 
considered by many Uyghurs to be the appropriate answer to their self-perception as a 
suffering nation under colonial rule, and the sense that only through proper religious 
observance could they persuade God to change their fate. For some, however, the call 
was to a more militant form of resistance. In the public-private sphere of Uyghur 
social media, emerging forms of religiosity and new forms of affective connection 
flourished, centred on the mediated, disembodied sound of the male voice, and they 
found their most radical expression in the sung form of anashid. 
 
Violence and sacrifice 
Letter to my Mother (Anamgha yezilghan xet)7 
 
If someone says, you can live for a hundred years as a rabbit,  
I reply, I wish to live for one day as a tiger.  
Please, mother, understand that your son is now a mujahid,  
I must be brave in spirit.  
The rocks and stones will be my blanket.  
As long as I live I will continue to do jihad.  
Pray to Allah for us.  
I will be happy to die on the battlefield as a mujahid.  
Maybe some day you will hear a quiet voice.  
If that voice says that your son has died,  
Mother, then your son is living joyfully in heaven.  
Never doubt that the martyrs  
Will find joy in heaven. 
 
This powerfully affective nashid circulated in audio and video versions across the 
Uyghur diaspora and within Xinjiang, on various media platforms including Facebook 
and YouTube, and we found it being shared on Undidar groups in 2013. The 
recording featured a young male spoken voice, heavy with reverb, speaking directly 
to his mother, followed by a sung nashid performed by the same solo voice. It was 
unaccompanied by musical instruments, so in the view of orthodox Muslims ‘not 
music’, and religiously permissable. With its young male pop voice, repeated falling 
riffs and use of vocal counterpoint, in melodic style it was clearly linked to the 
transnational sound world of Islamic anashid.  
 
Traditional anashid—sung poetry praising Allah—have a long history in the Muslim 
world. Today, established recording industries across the Middle East and South East 
Asia cater to a significant sub-culture of listeners who consume local popular styles of 
anashid. These are often linked to modern, reformist styles of Islam, but are not 
overtly political or radical (Pieslak 2015; Rasmussen 2010). In Turkey, new styles of 
popular religious song called anashid played a significant role in creating the new 
aesthetic and ethical conditions that led to the rise of the Islamist movement (Stokes 
2016). Examples like the Uyghur ‘Letter to Mother’ belong to a sub-genre of political 
or ‘jihadi’ anashid that can be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the 
period of violent struggle between Arab Islamist groups and governments in Syria and 
Egypt. Here, radical anashid formed an important aspect of the Islamist cultural 
offensive, and were used to reach new youth audiences and to inspire them to join the 
armed struggle (Said 2012).  
 
Radical anashid have been used as soundtracks for videos produced by Hamas, Fateh 
and Hizbolla in the context of the Palestinian struggle, and by Da’esh to accompany 
videos depicting their victories in battle or the execution of hostages (Pieslak 2009, 
2015). The contemporary anashid developed in Iraq and Syria by Al Qaeda and 
Da’esh are more recognizably rooted in the globalized musical language of pop. They 
commonly use a cappella song style and complex vocal harmonizations and 
arrangements. The use of a cappella is in part a strategy to escape the morally dubious 
sphere of ‘music’. This reliance on the unaccompanied voice aligns anashid with core 
sounded Islamic practices, but the style of vocalization is radically different from that 
of the recited Qur’an. Gone are the nasality and melisma of Qur’anic recitation and 
the strict rules of tajwid that govern the pronunciation and delivery of the Qur’anic 
text. These musical productions draw instead on the world of pop, especially the 
breathy intimacy of the sentimental pop ballad, indexing the listening experience of 
teenagers. Anashid eschew musical instruments in order to escape problematic 
associations with ‘music’ but they are thoughtfully constructed as musical works, and 
in terms of production quality and style they draw directly on the technologies and the 
values developed within the music industry. Their carefully crafted sonic texture 
draws on techniques of reverb, delay, and various digitally manipulated effects 
familiar to listeners from the world of pop music production, with the aim of 
increasing the affective listening experience and thus increasing the impact of the 
message (Pieslak 2015: 25-29).  
 
Listening to radical anashid via Undidar, then, was a pleasurable experience for many 
people, and especially for young Uyghur men. The connectivity and anonymity nature 
of social media also facilitated the sharing of these audio files across the diaspora and 
into the Uyghur homeland. Dorothea Schulz notes the ease with which social media 
allow immediate sharing and commenting across geographical space, stretching the 
boundaries of the audience and introducing new senses of community, repositioning 
listeners as co-creators. In this way locality and identities are increasingly defined 
through circulation (Schulz 2006). The Uyghur-language sermon and the radical 
anashid are both translations of Islamist discourse that circulates globally. But in 
every different locale, this kind of rhetoric, and more importantly this style of vocal 
performance, take root and works their way into local debates and sensibilities in 
different ways. It is crucial is to trace the particular ways that they play out in 
particular places. In the Uyghur milieu, these new sensibilities have especially come 
into play in opposition to the trope of song and dance. This, I argue, is because of the 
heightened politicization of song-and-dance due to its fifty-year history of association 
with the Chinese state and state representations of Uyghur identity. 
 
An Anniversary Gala 
 
Let us take another case study, a Facebook discussion held amongst exile Uyghurs in 
the winter of 2015. The campaigning exile organization, the World Uyghur Congress 
posted images of dancing children and a Uyghur music ensemble performing at a gala 
celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Uyghur community in Germany. I 
should emphasize that song-and-dance performance has not generally been regarded 
by the political opposition in exile as a cunning plot by the Chinese state to 
marginalize and disempower Uyghurs. Staged musical performance and dance have 
been a completely normalized way to perform community, assert national pride, and 
to do political work in the diaspora. But on this occasion, dissenting voices emerged 
in a comment thread below the post: 
 
‘Unsheathed Sword’: Is our community still doing this song-and-dance? 
 
‘Vengeance Boy’: Just when the Chinese government is trying to make our 
Uyghur people into atheists by forcing them to sing and dance, our Uyghurs in 
the free world are voluntarily organizing song and dance activities. Doesn’t that 
prove they actually think the Chinese government is doing the right thing? … 
It’s like a man whose parents have died and he wraps up the body in a reed mat 
and goes to a party. Because of these constant tragedies Uyghurs are 
experiencing, we should be in a state of mourning, but you guys are organizing 
song-and-dance! 
 
‘Unsheathed Sword’: Why are Uyghurs doing this in exile, when in Islam song 
and dance is forbidden? 
 
‘Son of Turkestan’: This culture was taught to them by the Chinese.8 
 
This kind of ethical religious and political stance gained increasing credibility and 
power in Uyghur transnational networks in the aftermath of the 2009 violence and 
subsequent crackdown. The prominence of song-and-dance in state representations of 
the Uyghurs created a backlash, bringing together Islamist anxieties about music with 
Uyghur nationalist anti-state sentiment. Singing and dancing was not only un-Islamic 
and immoral bodily behavior, it was inexorably linked in this discourse to China’s 
presumed state project to weaken, corrupt and subjugate the Uyghur nation.  
 
In 2014, the US-based Uyghur scientist, Erkin Sidiq, a prominent member of the exile 
community, started an anxious discussion on music on a Uyghur language web forum: 
 
One of our younger brothers … asked me about the middle path of Islam, and 
how we should regard song-and-dance; is it halal or haram? Some fatwa say if its 
content is unhealthy then we should not listen to it. I know that in history when 
Muslims went to jihad or on the hajj they would sing. In olden times armies 
marched into battle playing music. [But then I heard] Yasir Qadhi [a conservative 
American Islamic scholar] explaining that stringed instruments belong to Satan 
and it is a sin to listen to them. When I learned this I couldn’t sleep for days 
because music plays an important role for Uyghurs and our identity. We cannot 
maintain our culture without music. How to solve this problem? When Uyghurs 
accepted Islam we already had a very rich heritage. We cannot abandon 
everything for Islam, can we? We have a thousand year long history of song, 
dance and music. Have we been committing sin all this time?9 
 
Several discussions of these issues were conducted on several Uyghur language 
message boards: what kinds of music might be haram, and what kinds permissible, 
and why thinking about music distracted the Uyghur nation from its necessary task of 
self-discipline and development. Detailed fatwa on music and dance in Islam can be 
found on several Uyghur language websites hosted in Turkey, with lengthy quotes 
from the hadith explaining the particular types of music and the particular contexts 
where listening to music is haram.10 Taken together, these anxious debates evidenced 
a growing divide within the Uyghur community between the educated urban elite 
nationalists who had for decades worn their religion with a light touch, and new styles 
of religiosity concentrated among rural dwellers and business people. 
 
Historically in this region, musical culture has flourished as an integral part of 
religious expression, especially within Sufi orders and within popular practices 
influenced by Sufism. In contemporary practice, musical traditions of muqam and 
meshrep songs are performed at shrine festivals by religious mendicants (ashiq), and 
Sufi mystic poetry is sung in sama’ rituals to the accompaniment of percussion and 
stringed musical instruments (Harris 2009; Light 2008). This musical-religious 
culture has for centuries co-existed in creative tension with more orthodox 
interpretations of the permissibility of music and dance in Islamic custom. These 
tensions and debates—which are replicated across the Islamic world—are rehearsed 
in some of the earliest extant religious texts from the region, such as the sixteenth 
century Treatise on Audition written by the Central Asian Sufi master Ahmad Kasani 
Dahbidi. Kasani explains that human beings are composed of spirituality and 
sensuality. If spirituality is predominant in people, then listening to beautiful voices 
will bring them closer to God, but if sensuality is dominant, then listening to fine 
voices will incline them towards fornication and obscenity. In other words, the 
practice of listening to music is neither the cause nor the problem; the real stake is the 
nature of the individuals (Papas 2015). Such debates on the moral effects of listening 
to music are reproduced in the folk stories that circulate in Uyghur society. A 
nineteenth century tale recounts that on the Day of Judgment, Satan will appear riding 
on a donkey whose tail hairs are made of the strings of musical instruments, and the 
sounds they produce will entice people to follow him to hell (Bellér-Hann 2000: 41).  
 
Attitudes to music in contemporary rural Uyghur society are likewise a field of debate 
and fine nuance. Village socializing revolves around live musical performance and 
social dancing in ways that are certainly not part of life for other Muslim peoples of 
China. In the village in Southern Xinjiang where I conducted fieldwork between 2006 
and 2012, playing musical instruments was regarded by most people as something 
inappropriate for respectable or high-status members of the community, and 
especially inappropriate for women, although dancing at village gatherings (called 
meshrep) was generally considered acceptable. Meshrep were highly valued, but the 
musicians who performed at them generally came from the lower end of the scale in 
village society. For respected religious figures such as haji (those who have 
completed the pilgrimage to Mecca) or imam (religious clerics) even attending 
musical gatherings might provoke comment. As the Islamic revival gathered in 
momentum, voices proclaiming the moral dangers of listening to music, and the 
inappropriateness of public dancing for women, became increasingly dominant, 
within this village and right across the region. 
 
In these new debates, which were conducted between friends meeting in town 
restaurants, in village homes, student dormitories, and across transnational digitally 
mediated networks, views on the permissibility of music within an Islamic lifestyle 
intersected with questions of national identity and the relationship between Uyghurs 
and the Chinese state. The heavy emphasis on song-and-dance in state representations 
of Uyghur identity created a negative cycle, bringing together traditional Islamic 
anxieties about music with modern anti-state sentiment. In this climate it became 
harder for Uyghur nationalists to defend their interests in what they still regarded as 
their national music (milliy-muzika), but what critics denigrated as song-and-dance 
(naxsha-usul), precisely because it was so hard to dissociate it from support for, or at 
least acquiescence in the Chinese state project to uphold its rule over the Uyghur 
region. 
 
A Wedding Video 
 
These debates, as we have seen, are clearly articulated on transnational media 
networks, but within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where the religious 
and political spheres are tightly policed, there is less scope for public debate on such 
issues. Instead, shifting ethical norms are expressed through the ways people act, 
through embodied practices. This is especially visible where different norms collide. 
In his discussion of approaches to contemporary Islam in Central Asia, Johan 
Rasanayagam argues for the need to study how individuals fashion themselves as 
Muslim in contexts where governments maintain tight control over religious 
expression. Because of these state imposed constraints, lived experience in these 
contexts is privileged over debate as a site for moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is not 
only expressed through cognitive reflection but is also inherent within experience: an 
embodied, ongoing engagement in a social and material world (Rasanayagam 2006). 
This approach also has important advantages for understanding women’s experience, 
in contexts where women’s bodies are foregrounded as political symbols, but 
women’s voices are particularly hard to hear. 
 
A wedding video made in the southern town of Khotan in spring 2016 provides a 
fascinating text to analyze the complex negotiations that now surround dancing in 
small-town Xinjiang.11 Wedding videos are a major industry in Uyghur society; an 
essential component of every wedding. Usually set to a soundtrack of celebratory 
Uyghur pop songs, these often lengthy videos, running to three hours, show the whole 
extended process of the wedding, including the core ritual (nikah) conducted by the 
local imam, the greeting of the guests who stand stiffly to attention as the camera 
records their presence, the banquet, and the convoy of cars carrying bride and groom 
between destinations. They are to an extent manufactured representations of the 
family. Made to be viewed together, with friends and the extended family, and 
replayed years after the event for visitors, they are intended to show off family wealth 
and prestige, fashion or piety. However, in the less carefully edited sections of the 
videos it is possible to capture moments of tension, where people’s embodied 
responses to events evidence the collision of shifting ideologies and norms of 
behaviour. 
 
In this particular video, a curious contretemps occurs as the bride and her friends 
arrived in their car at the banquet venue. The sounds of a drum-and-shawm (naghra-
sunay) band greet the guests as they alight. A group of men in suits and embroidered 
hats (doppa) mill around the road, greeting each other. One man decides to persuade 
the chief bridesmaid out of her car. The woman emerges, modestly dressed in a full-
length floral dress, pink headscarf covering her head and neck. “Let’s dance!” he calls. 
Apparently embarrassed, she makes a token effort at the customary movements of the 
dance he demands, but she holds her hand in front of her face, attempting to shield her 
identity from the prying camera. Sensing a dip in the celebratory mood, more of the 
men come forward to dance and utter celebratory shouts. As men, they have less to 
worry about in terms of community gossip. The woman escapes back to the safety of 
her car. Then the groom arrives, and the men grab him bodily and try to force him to 
dance. He is not at all interested, and gesticulates angrily at them. The video cuts 
abruptly to a still of a flower bouquet. 
 
 
Still from a wedding video, Khotan 2016, copy shared by Mu Qian with permission. 
 
In moments like this we can observe the way that ideological debates trickle down 
into popular consciousness and inform everyday actions. Forms of bodily practice 
have been a key focus of analysis in discussion of the Islamic revival in the Middle 
East. In her study of the revival movement in Egypt (2005), Saba Mahmood argues 
that forms of bodily practice (veiling, daily prayers or reciting the Qur’an) do not 
simply express the self but also shape the self that they are supposed to signify. 
Ethical self-formation, such as strengthening the desire to perform the daily prayers, 
can be achieved through constant vigilance, honing ones moral capacities in order to 
please God. These habits of cultivation have also been central to the development of 
the Uyghur Islamic revival, as evidenced by the thousands of Uyghur men and 
women who began to engage in these kinds of ethical practice over the course of the 
past two decades. These forms of habitus are part of the cultivation of gestural 
capacities which is central to the Islamic and Christian traditions: habitus as a set of 
practices formed through specific pedagogical processes in order to acquire moral 
character. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu describes habitus more broadly as a system of dispositions, a set of 
acquired characteristics that are the product of specific social conditions. As a theory 
of social power, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus emphasises change and process; it is 
formed through the changing dynamics between agents—individuals, groups and 
institutions—and also between agents and their environment (1984: 170). Habitus 
transforms, but is also transformed by the environment within which it is set into play. 
By highlighting the dynamism of habitus, Bourdieu raises the possibility of using the 
concept to explain situations of radical social change. This perception is key to 
understanding the fraught relationship between Islam, Uyghur national identity and 
song-and-dance in this period. As these processes of Islamic subject-formation 
acquired increasing importance in constructs of Uyghur identity, singing and dancing 
were increasingly configured as bodily actions that were antithetical to the Islamic 
cultivation of a pious disposition. If, in the view of the religious reformists, singing 
and dancing had previously figured in Uyghur culture, then this was merely evidence 
of a national failure to follow ‘correct’ Islamic practice, and part of the reason for the 
nation’s subjugation under Chinese rule. The prominence of song-and-dance in state 
representations of the Uyghurs fed into this narrative that linked song and dance with 
national subjugation. Only by cleansing Uyghur bodies of these un-Islamic practices 
would God forgive them and throw off the yoke of infidel rule.  
 
As we saw in the example of the young woman who sang Historia d’Amor on a 
Turkish TV show, women bear the heaviest burden in terms of the new requirements 
for ethical behaviour. Here again, in this wedding video, we observe women caught at 
the sharp end of changing ethical standards, with dance taking its place alongside 
song as site of tension. The man’s invitation to the bridesmaid to dance is customary 
practice in Uyghur weddings, part of the ritual exchange of courtesies between the 
two families. But in the new ethical milieu that took hold in Uyghur society after 
2009, for a woman to be caught on camera dancing in the street was to expose herself 
to public shaming. How should she respond? Negotiating the conflicting demands of 
identity politics, tradition and changing religious norms is today part of the complex 
work of being a Uyghur woman in Xinjiang, a project of self-fashioning in which 
opposing political forces have so much invested that the space for women to fashion 
their own ways of being is increasingly conflicted and constrained. 
 
These gendered bodily dilemmas bear the traces of the colonial and the diasporic 
experience. As Appadurai has noted, women typically bear the brunt of the strains of 
cultural reproduction in diasporic conditions, where women’s ‘honour’ often becomes 
a surrogate for male identity (1996: 44), and embodied practices are key sites for the 
contesting of culture under these conditions. In the Uyghur Islamic revival, under the 
twin pressures of state appropriation of musical performance and Islamist prohibitions 
on musical performance, the space for women’s musical expression is doubly 
foreclosed. Music is regarded as religiously suspect, and the dancing female body is 
tainted by association with the colonial regime. The singing voice is disassociated 
from the female body, purified and reconceived as ‘not music’. Idealized images of 
Uyghur womanhood as silent, symbols of piety, veiled and eyes cast down, directly 
oppose the state-promoted images of brightly coloured, smiling female dancers. In 
their place, the male voice is idealised as both religiously permissible and as a symbol 
of national identity, and eagerly consumed through mediated encounters with 
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